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Abstract
Cybersecurity attacks and software used to perpetrate them are constantly evolving in the face of
improved methods for detection and mitigation. An important element of cyber-attacks is use of
Command & Control (C2) infrastructure to send commands and receive data from targets. A
major issue with C2s is how to establish a persistent communication channel from compromised
hosts to their server while avoiding detection. This work focuses on the development of a Proofof-Concept (PoC) for a relatively novel raw-socket based C2 “JT” and includes a discussion of
relevant C2 technologies/trends along with their corresponding techniques. The C2 development
was informed by this past work. The development featured 2 sets of internal testing and
development each followed by testing phases (at virtual cyber defense competitions held in Fall
2020 and Spring 2021). In both competitions, the C2 was run on Linux and FreeBSD platforms.
In the first competition, two out of seven teams detected and removed the agent from their
machines. After further development based on these results and implementation of additional
defense evasion techniques, resulted in the C2 being undetected in the second competition. This
work can be further built upon and refined for development of more advanced raw socket based
C2s in the future.
Keywords: C2, Proof-of-Concept, Sockets, Command & Control
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1. Introduction
With the increasing incidence of cyber-attacks, it is important to understand how cyberattacks may be carried out in order to better defend against them. Typically, this process is
conceptualized using the Cyber Kill Chain model developed by Lockheed Martin (Spitzner,
2019).

Figure 1
Cyber Kill Chain by Lockheed Martin (Systems, 2018)
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This model, shown in Figure 1, was developed in order to assist incident responders and
cybersecurity professionals in assessing security tools’ ability to detect and remediate threats
based on each step of the kill chain.
One of the most visible stages within the cyber kill chain is Command & Control (C2).
According to the MITRE Attack Framework (2018), C2s are “techniques that adversaries may
use to communicate with systems under their control within a victim network (MITRE
Corporation, 2018).” In other words, a successful C2 should be able to send information back
and forth from the attackers and their victims. If this communication is poorly hidden, this
interaction can generally be detected through analysis of network traffic by Security Operations
Center (SOC) departments within organizations, which are tasked with monitoring and detecting
potential attacks or suspicious activity.
Due to the importance of C2 communications, to both malicious attackers and ethical
hackers / penetration testers (professionals hired to test organizational security under the purview
of the organization), there has been a push in the security industry to create new and better open
source C2 options in order to ease the process for ethical hackers to test and report potential
issues so that they can be remediated.
A perfect example of this trend is the SANS Slingshot C2 Matrix created by Jorge
Orchilles, Bryson Bort and Adam Mashinchi (SANS, 2020). The goal of the project is to reduce
the time and knowledge necessary to pick out the proper C2 for a target organization based on
various metrics such as communication protocol and capabilities (SANS, 2020).
At the same time, however, security companies are becoming better at identifying
malicious traffic. Malware (or malicious software) and methods of attack are constantly
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changing. In an effort to identify this type of activity, information security tools can employ
techniques such as pattern matching (signatures) that uniquely identify certain types of known
malware or behavioral-based techniques to identify potential suspicious activity. This leads to
the constant evolution of both attack techniques, tools, and processes as well as those for
defending against them.
As a major step in the kill-chain and cyber-attack process, research on C2s plays an
important role in understanding how to detect/respond to C2 activity. This work attempts to
investigate and present a relatively unexplored communication technique and novel storage
system for a C2 Framework. It also attempts to test the developed C2’s feasibility as a part of a
cyber-attack and determine if it is capable of staying undetected on a host actively monitored by
student defenders.
The next section will provide a network foundation, functionality of representative C2s,
detection and monitoring technologies and their advances, subsequent evolution of C2
communication, and trends in C2 development; including specific focus on raw socket-based
C2s, which have informed this work.
2. Literature Review
As discussed, C2s have evolved and improved over the past two decades in terms of
escaping discovery as well as improved functions and communication. At the same time, there
have been significant efforts to detect and mitigate these improved C2s, which in turn lead to
changes in C2 functionality. This section aims to provide an overview of these developments and
provide examples of current C2s and detection methods.
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2.1 Networking Basics
To better understand the motivations and decisions for this work, it is important to define
some basic networking terminology used throughout this paper. Networking is often described in
terms of layers within the OSI (Open Systems Interconnection) model or the Internet (TCP/IP)
model. Both models are shown in Figure 2 below.

OSI Model

Internet Model (TCP/IP)

Application

Presentation

Application

Session
Transport

Transport

Network

Network

Data Link

Network
Interface

Physical
Figure 2
OSI Model & Internet (TCP/IP) Model

This section will mainly focus on describing the Network & Transport layer of these
models since these are where C2s mainly operate. The Transport layer deals with two main
protocols: 1) Transport Control Protocol (TCP) and 2) the User Datagram Protocol (UDP).
However, TCP is the only relevant protocol with respect to this work. Both protocols use ports in
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order to communicate, however, TCP is more reliable than UDP. These ports are similar to docks
in a shipyard; specific boats are assigned to go in and out of them.
Using this analogy, let us say that a cruise ship named “The HTTPS” is departing from
Florida source port (dock) 1030 and is headed to a shipyard near Google’s headquarters at
destination port (dock) 443. The HTTPS is carrying Florida’s Google searches for processing at
Google. At the same time, another ship named “The SSH” is departing from Florida source port
1031 and is headed towards the same shipyard at destination port 22. “The SSH” is carrying
commands to be delivered at Google. With so much ship traffic, how do you ensure that the
correct ship is in the correct port? The answer is by looking at the ship’s navigation log (TCP
header) to identify the source and destination ports. In other words, the ships in this example
represents a TCP segment and the cargo they are carrying is data transferred from the higher
layers of the network. This example demonstrates how the Transport layer works.
The Network layer focuses on the Internet Protocol (IP) address. An IP address is similar
to the mailing address for individuals at a certain location; it must be unique in order to find the
right destination. IPv4 (invented in the 1980s) defines the structure of the IP Address and limits
the total amount of unique available “locations” to only 4.3 billion addresses (Patrizo, 2020).
This may seem like plenty, however, with the advent of new technologies these addresses
were quickly exhausted (Patrizo, 2020). As a solution, a system of public and private addresses
was created. In this system, a portion of available addresses were reserved to act as the private
addresses. Private addresses (e.g., 192.168.1.1) can be used internally, such as, within a
University to increase the number of devices that can be supported on the network.
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However, if a computer wants to talk externally to the internet it needs to go through a
router with a public address. Since private addresses cannot be used outside of the home/office,
Network Address Translation (NAT) was created in order to translate private addresses into
public addresses.
To demonstrate the concepts talked about in the previous three paragraphs, let us go back
to the ship example. Let us say that the boxes (labeled with the source and destination port) of
website data and command data were unloaded. Now the question is, how does the delivery
driver know what address to deliver it to and how to get there? This is done through IP
addressing. Now, let us say that Google’s HQ is in a large office building with other businesses.
In that case, a doorperson checks to see what floor number Google is on and delivers the boxes
there. The doorperson in this example is NAT working as intended.
The layer directly below the Transport layer is the Network layer. The resulting data from
the Network layer is called a packet which contains the data from all of the layers above it,
including the Transport Layer segment. In advanced detection methodologies discussed further
in the paper, a packet’s contents are opened up and examined in a process called Deep Packet
Inspection (DPI). This information can include application type (e.g., web traffic) along with
routing information, e.g., port & IP information (Fortinet, n.d.).
Knowing how the Transport and Network layers interact and their functions is essential
to better understanding how network detection and mitigation techniques work; as well as how
C2s function. These techniques will be discussed in the next sections.
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2.2 Detection & Mitigation Techniques for Network Traffic for C2s
There have been countless innovations in the field of C2 network traffic detection. One
more recent development is the ability to identify unique applications based on network traffic.
This technology works by uniquely describing and identifying an application by using several
different indicators found via deep packet inspection, including: source and destination ports,
signatures within traffic, and contents of the traffic (Palo Alto Networks, 2015). For example, an
ID for HTTP/(S) (web traffic) would search for common parameters, e.g., the type of request
(GET, POST).
Furthermore, advanced Next Generation Firewalls (NGFS) have been steadily
implementing new signatures and detections in order to better monitor network traffic. For
example, with version 8.0 Palo Alto released anti-spyware signatures that automatically detect
suspicious C2 communications despite rapidly changing C2 IP addresses or seemingly innocent
server hostnames. This is done by monitoring the network traffic for trends in connections (Palo
Alto Networks, 2020a).
Another network defense capable of detecting malicious C2 traffic is called a NIDS
(Network Intrusion Detection System). NIDS are used by organizations to monitor network
traffic for indicators of compromise (RedScan, n.d.). NIDS detection techniques can be classified
into three categories: anomaly detection, misuse detection, and specification-based detection.
Each category uses a different approach in order to detect malicious behavior. Anomaly
detection does this by attempting to establish a baseline of what is normal traffic within the
network. Anything that goes against this baseline is flagged as suspicious. Misuse detection, on
the other hand, utilizes signatures and pattern matching in order to detect malicious behavior.
Misuse detection only works if the attack has been seen before and a pattern has been created for
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the attack. This is a major flaw since slightly different C2s are capable of circumventing misuse
detection. Finally, specification-based detection relies on predefined rules custom made by
security personnel that establish what is allowed on the network and what is not allowed. If
traffic does not comply with these rules, an alert is generated. The issue with specification-based
detection is that it could turn up a large number of false positives if not properly configured
(Ghorbani, Lu, & Tavallaee, 2010).
The issue with the above techniques is they might be thrown off when encryption is
implemented to secure C2 communications. Therefore, it is necessary to discuss detection
techniques for encrypted traffic, specifically in the next section.
2.3 Detection & Mitigation Techniques for Encrypted Traffic Specifically
There was a time where almost all malware and C2s in the wild were not encrypted with
TLS (Transport Layer Security) or another protocol. Unfortunately, that time has passed quickly.
Even Agrobot, published in 2003, contains an option to encrypt traffic utilizing SSL (Secure
Sockets Layer) (Barford & Yegneswaran, 2007). As mentioned previously, detection of
unencrypted C2 traffic is relatively simple to implement. Signature-based detection and the
ability to conduct deep packet inspection can properly categorize and scan network traffic to
identify an unencrypted C2.
Most companies deploy tools capable of performing this type of inspection either with a
NIDS (Network Intrusion Detection System), e.g., LastLine Defender, or with a firewall, e.g.,
Palo Alto Networks Firewall. With an increasing number of encrypted C2s, both closed- and
open-sourced, there is an abundance of research attempting to bridge the detection gap.
Anderson, Paul, and McGrew (2018) determined that it is possible to differentiate malicious
from benign TLS traffic by looking at the server certificate, key bit-length (2048 bits), and TLS
8

parameters indicative of Tor browsers. However, this is mostly circumstantial data and attackers
can mimic enterprise encryption standards easily.
Carlos Novo and Ricardo Morla (2020) do something similar but train their model with
statistics generated through network traffic flow analysis. For example, the model takes statistics
such as TCP Windows Size (how much data can be sent at once), time between the first and last
payload (malware or commands delivered to the victim computer), retransmission of packets,
and more into account (Novo & Morla, 2020). If the attacker does not attempt to change default
settings, the model was found to be 94% effective (Novo & Morla, 2020). Even when the
attacker modified the duration of traffic flow by 100% (most effective at avoiding detection), the
model was still 51.3% effective (Novo & Morla, 2020). These studies indicate that it is indeed
possible to look at in depth TLS characteristics in order to detect malware with a reasonable
degree of certainty.
There are mitigation options available to better detect and respond to encrypted C2
traffic. To counter the rising occurrence of SSL traffic, both Palo Alto Networks Firewall and
Fortinet Firewall offer functionality to decrypt traffic before deploying advanced detection
features (Palo Alto Networks, 2020c); (Fortinet, 2020). In an ideal world, blocking all SSL
traffic that cannot be decrypted by the firewall could be done to allow better visibility. However,
this jeopardizes confidentiality of user and employee data and could potentially overwhelm a
firewall’s resources. Rather, it is necessary to make decisions on what traffic to decrypt and what
to leave encrypted (Palo Alto Networks, 2020c).
Other mitigation options exist, e.g., URL/IP block lists, however, with the advent of
techniques such as DGA (Domain Generation Algorithm) this is less effective since the
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algorithm is easily able to generate thousands of random domains (e.g., google1234.com) a day
(Palo Alto Networks, 2020b).
2.4 Evolution of Communication Methods & Network Based Defense Evasion
C2 communication methods have evolved over the past two decades in response to the
increase in sophistication of network detection techniques. However, originally, one of the first
methods of communication for malicious actors was the IRC (Internet Relay Chat) protocol in
order to efficiently manage large botnets (network of controlled machines). Back then, IRC chats
were used extensively to create large chat groups. In other words, it was that era’s equivalent of
Discord. These IRC channels were used to execute commands on the bots and perform attacks,
such as, Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDOS). DDoS uses multiple machines’ resources in
order to overwhelm a target with network traffic. Ultimately, this was capable of causing website
outages and other critical service outages.
Bartford and Yegneswaran (2007) provide a relatively comprehensive overview of some
of the earliest IRC botnets. Bartford and Yegneswaran (2007) examine four IRC bots spanning
those created from 1998 to 2003. Typically, the bots had various mechanisms to join an IRC
server with a unique nickname/identifier and standby for additional commands from the IRC
server (Barford & Yegneswaran, 2007). One of the most important aspects to keep in mind for
this period was that most bots were unencrypted, even though Agrobot would have been capable
of implementing SSL (Secure Socket Layer) encryption (Barford & Yegneswaran, 2007).
Therefore, it is fairly simple to detect commonplace IRC commands such as ‘JOIN’ commands
and block them immediately at the network level. Furthermore, it is hard to hide in corporate
networks using a technology that was originally developed for chat purposes.
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With the advent of new detection techniques, such as the ability to identify applications,
it was necessary for attackers to find protocols that are common enough within a network that
they should not be blocked. HTTP/(S) serves as a perfect protocol for this purpose since it is one
of the most commonly used web protocols in the world. If companies block HTTP/(S) with
Application-ID across the entire network, then they would shut down access to their (or any) web
servers.
To get a sense of how common web protocols are abused for malicious communications,
one does not need to look much farther than the MITRE Attack Framework technique T1071.001
(MITRE Corporation, 2020). The framework lists 200 different instances of malware using
HTTP(S) to communicate (MITRE Corporation, 2020). According to MITRE (2020), C2s using
this method for communication hide data within optional headers in order to pass for innocent
traffic. An example of this is shown in Figure 3 below:

Figure 3
Sample HTTP callback (FireEye, 2014)

At first glance, this traffic (Figure 3) looks like a normal POST request, which is one of
the methods HTTP implements to send and request data from a web server. However, upon
inspection, the User-Agent header information is suspicious. A typical User-Agent header would
contain the web browser/program used to navigate or interact with the website. For example,
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Figure 4 demonstrates what a normal User-Agent would show for someone who uses a Mozilla
Firefox browser on a Linux Operating System (OS).

Figure 4
Normal User-Agent

However, in the case of Figure 3, the User-Agent header includes both the victim
machine OS as well as an additional string: “<|>plus<|>nan-av<|>false”. This string
communicates to the attacker that there is no anti-virus software installed on the target computer
(FireEye, 2014).
Following use of the HTTP(S) protocol to avoid detection, attackers started to expand
their toolkit by also using DNS (Domain Name System) for C2 communications. This protocol is
used for the exact same reason as HTTP(S); it is a widely used protocol that is impossible to
completely block without severely impacting operations. If DNS is blocked, URLs such as
“google.com” would not work since domain names could not be translated to their corresponding
IP address (e.g., 172.217.12.142). DNS can be used to instruct malware to execute commands on
a victim computer and exfiltrate or steal data.
Exfiltrating data through normal DNS traffic is called DNS Tunnelling (Palo Alto
Networks, 2020). In this kind of attack, the DNS protocol is abused by malicious actors to send
fake responses (commands) and obtain sensitive data by creating a “tunnel” made possible due to
lack of restrictions for DNS traffic (Checkpoint Software Technologies, n.d.). Since DNS has
become so powerful in hiding malicious communications, it has become almost a standard in the
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malware community. It has become so common place that 80% of malware studied by Palo
Alto’s Unit 42 threat research team used DNS to conduct C2 operations (Palo Alto Networks,
2020b). Figure 5 illustrates an example of exfiltration of data from a C2 using DNS.

Figure 5
Sample exfiltration of data to a C2 through DNS (Falcone, 2019)

In other cases, Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) customize the protocol used based on
typical traffic specific to the target environment in order to avoid detection. An APT
characteristically attempts to compromise and maintain access for months, and even, years. A
recent example of an APT tailoring their C2 communication protocol to the environment is
Sunburst’s wide-reaching campaign through SolarWinds Orion (Eckels, Smith, & Ballenthin,
2020).
According to FireEye(2014)’s analysis, Sunburst would disguise all messages with a
payload of 10,000 or less bits as normal Orion Improvement Program messages that collects data
from SolarWinds users intended to be used for product improvement . If the message were larger
than 10,000 bits, Sunburst would send messages in an innocuous-looking HTTP request (Eckels
et al., 2020).
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C2s use other miscellaneous communication techniques as well. For example, C2
communications have increasingly started to use steganography methods to hide commands in
images. These images could be posted on social media, e.g., Twitter, and the C2 would be
directed to a certain account to search for images, download them and follow any hidden
commands found within. This traffic could be easily configured to look similar to a normal user
browsing social media pictures. (Gardiner, Cova, & Nagaraja, 2014)
2.5 Host-Based Defense Evasion
As evidenced, advancement of network detection and mitigation technologies incited
change in C2 network communication methods. Similarly, as host-based defense systems (e.g.,
anti-virus and built-in OS security) have evolved, attackers were forced to improve their methods
to circumvent these countermeasures. In the early IRC bots examined in Barford and
Yegneswaran’s (2007) work, only 1 out of 4 (Agrobot) had basic features to tamper with
antivirus software and monitor for common tools that could be used to reverse engineer its code
to determine its purpose. However, after Microsoft released security controls to prevent
applications from running with administrator-level privileges (called User Account Control)
along with an ingrained antivirus software, called Windows Defender, this began to change
(Microsoft, n.d.a); (Microsoft, n.d.b).
While it is beyond the scope of this paper to cover all of the advancements made by
malware and C2s to avoid host-based defenses, the following section will cover two recent
examples of advanced malware that have a C2 component: 1) Drovorub and 2) Sunburst.
2.5.1 Drovorub
Drovorub is an advanced malware toolkit targeting Linux systems and consists of a client
and a rootkit (National Security Agency, The Federal Bureau of Investigations, 2020). A rootkit
14

is a piece of code capable of hiding the presence of malware by intercepting and modifying OS
functionality that would otherwise reveal it (MITRE Corporation, 2017). In this case, Drovorub’s
rootkit is able to intercept kernel system calls (allows system hardware to communicate and
perform tasks requested by an application) in order to hide Drovorub client processes and
malicious network connections.
For example, Drovorub intercepts and modifies the kernel’s Iterate_dir functionality in
order to filter out and hide its executable from terminal command results. By intercepting
numerous kernel functions, Drovorub makes it exponentially more difficult to detect it using
existing tools unless the forensic examiner knows exactly what they are searching for (National
Security Agency, The Federal Bureau of Investigations, 2020). A less advanced version of
filtering command results was deployed as part of the C2 POC developed as a part of this work.
2.5.2 Sunburst
While Drovorub is targeted at Linux machines, Sunburst attacks are focused on Windows
systems that had the SolarWinds Orion Platform. Sunburst trojanized (hid within) the Orion
business layer.dll (Windows process / code library that supports various processes) through a
valid Orion update. One of the key aspects of Sunburst is its ability to detect and attempt to kill
programs that may detect it (through a blocklist). If one of these programs is discovered,
Sunburst attempts to disable it and goes inactive/sleeps for a set period (Eckels et al., 2020).
Sunburst also ensures that certain time-based and system conditions are met before
running (Eckels et al., 2020). These actions, coupled with the network communication
techniques discussed previously, allowed it to stay undetected for a long period. Other malware
sometimes contains a list of services to avoid, however, it is unusual for malware to check for
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services as thoroughly as Sunburst did. In the future, the comprehensive review Sunburst runs
through may be the new normal for malware.
2.6 Trends in Design of C2s
In order to inform this work, current C2 trends were analyzed and incorporated within the
presented POC. Existing work done by Jorge Orchilles et.al (n.d.) comprehensively evaluates
most open source and some closed source C2s. Therefore, this section is mainly based on
conclusions drawn from an analysis of SANS Slingshot data. However, even though the matrix
includes 68 C2s (not including Oyabun) in total, 28 of them are not completely documented on
the matrix (Orchilles et al., n.d.). Best efforts were made to fill in critical missing information
where possible. Furthermore, to ensure that the C2 matrix is comprehensive, searches for “C2”
and “command & control” were performed on GitHub. Even though there were some minor
older C2s found that were not included in the C2 matrix, it was determined that the matrix was
sufficient to assess general trends.
One of the first noticeable trends from the analysis of the data is the number of C2s with
custom profiles capability aka malleable profiles (Orchilles et al., n.d.). A malleable C2 is
capable of changing different aspects of how a client communicates with the server such as UserAgent, destination URIs, header information, etc. along with what type of encoding is utilized
(Mudge, 2015). This trend, as far as I could tell, started with Cobalt Strike in 2014. This
capability is especially focused on in commercial products with 5 out of 7 commercial C2s
(Brute Ratel, Cobalt Strike, Innuendo, Red Team Toolkit, Scythe) having this ability (Orchilles
et al., n.d.). This trend has also been included into 14 out of 33 open source C2s (Orchilles et al.,
n.d.).
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Table 1
Summarization of common trends – Adapted from SANS Slingshot

2.7 Previous C2s That Utilize Raw Sockets
Table 1 summarizes common trends in C2s. Out of those listed, three C2s use sockets as
the only available communication mechanism and two C2s offer sockets as an alternative
communication method. As discussed earlier, there has not been much development of primarily
socket based C2s, so other types of C2s have advancements that are also worthy of consideration
for implementation in the C2 developed.
As discussed, socket based C2s are not necessarily the most sophisticated, and each one
has its own share of design limitations. For example, the ReverseTCPShell C2 only works on the
Windows platform (ZHacker13, 2019) and CHAOS is only capable of effectively handling one
connection at a time (Lampert & Peterpt, 2017). The C2s closest in design to the work developed
is Eggshell and DeimosC2.
However, Eggshell (Jackson & Dillan, 2015) is geared towards IOS devices with very
limited Linux functionality. DeimosC2 (Paragonsec, DeimosC2, Sheina, & CharlesDardaman,
2020) was created a month before this project started and relies on other listeners besides TCP.
Its features are still immature since DeimosC2 is within its beta (testing) phase, however, it has
some advanced features that could make it a viable C2 framework in the future.
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This paper will attempt to implement an advanced raw socket based C2 that incorporates
as many of the trends listed above as possible. The next section will expand more on the specific
functionality goals and the approach to achieve them.
3. Methodology for Development
The first step for development was determining what a successful C2 should contain
based on perceived trends and capabilities of existing C2s as described above. Prior to this
discussion, it is important to establish some vocabulary that will be used throughout this paper
related to C2s. An “agent/client” refers to the malware running on a victim computer. The
“server” refers to the code running on the attacker’s own machine handling all agent/client
interactions. “GitHub” refers to the code management website that was used to develop and
manage the code.
Development occurred in two phases marked by two separate tests (covered by the next
section). The first stage of development was focused on implementing as many of these basic
features as possible. The second stage of development was focused on expanding that
functionality and developing mechanisms to achieve the advanced functionality features. Table 2
displays the functionality requirements:
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Table 2
Functional Requirements

The columns containing different OSs are designed to indicate if functionality is limited
to a specific OS. A checkmark denotes that the functionality was tested successfully. This table
will be updated at the end of each development phase.
After functionality goals were established, a programming language was chosen based on
four (4) metrics: 1) ease-of-use, 2) compatibility with systems, 3) pre-existing libraries (prebuilt
code/functionality), and 4) my prior knowledge of the language. These metrics are displayed in
Table 3.
Table 3
Programming Language Comparison Analysis

Python was selected as the programming language for the C2 development due to its low
difficulty (Mindfire Solutions, 2017) and numerous pre-existing libraries, especially since it has
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a dedicated socket library preinstalled that is ready to use on every OS it is installed on (Python,
n.d.).
Once the C2 development language and functionality was determined, the testing plan
was developed. The following sections will detail the subsequent development and testing that
took place as well as the results.
4. Development and Testing Process
Figure 6 provides an overview of the process used for development and testing. These
steps of the process will be expanded and discussed below.
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Figure 6
Development and testing methodology

Phase I and II testing was done at cyber defense competitions at the end of each phase of
development. During these competitions, each function detailed in Table 2 that was successfully
implemented during the development phase was tested at least once to verify effectiveness. If a
team successfully disabled the C2 agent during the competition, this was noted, and an
investigation was conducted to determine the probable method of detection. Lessons learned
from the Phase I competition were used to inform the subsequent phase’s development.
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4.1 General Competition Structure / Test Environment
In order to effectively test the C2, it was important to choose an environment where there
were skilled active defenders, a variety of operating systems, and had some semblance to the
real-world. Therefore, the “JT” C2 Framework was tested at the University at Buffalo, SUNY
(UB) Lockdown competition, which is held every semester. This competition would allow the
C2 to be tested against active defenders for six hours on various OSs. This year, due to the
COVID-19 pandemic, both competitions in Fall 2020 (October 17, 2020) and Spring 2021
(February 6, 2021) were held virtually instead of in-person, which is typical.
The UB Lockdown competition is designed to simulate a real-world active intrusion in a
company’s network and follows a similar format other popular cyber defense competition use,
e.g., National Collegiate Cyber Defense Competition (NCCDC). Every competition consists of
the following teams: blue team, red team, white team, and black team.
There are multiple blue teams with 6 people each in the competition, that have identical
networks and systems. These individuals are generally students with an information security
background who are charged with maintaining availability of services, defending their network
against the attacks from red team (hackers), and responding to business tasks directed from white
team (representing management) called “injects”.
An example of an inject would be to create a network inventory consisting of important
information for each computer on the network. The white team for this competition are students
who act as a liaison between the blue teams and other teams and are responsible for
creating/grading injects and determining the winner of the competition. The black team consists
of students who build and maintain the competition environment and infrastructure.
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The red team is a group of student penetration testers / ethical hackers who act as
attackers; they are charged with maintaining a presence (otherwise known as persistence) within
the target networks and disrupting services. This is done by deploying custom and publicly
available malicious tools to machines on a team’s network. An example of a service, in this
competition, is a basic website operating on HTTP that hosts company information.
5. Development – Phase I
Before writing the software, a test environment was created on a Dell PowerEdge R710
2.66ghz 12-core server with Proxmox VE installed. Proxmox VE was chosen because it is a free
OS designed specifically to create and store complicated networks of virtual machines (VMs). A
VM allows the running of one or more OSs on top of the host OS while sharing the host OS’
resources (Proxmox VE). For example, on a Windows PC, a Linux VM could be created and
networked through virtual infrastructure.
This structure was chosen since it is cost and space effective and easier to restore VMs
accidently corrupted during testing (a VM can be restored to a saved state). However, a
significant disadvantage to using VMs for C2 development/testing is that some malware and C2s
change their behavior or refuse to run if they detect virtualization software; this checking is done
to prevent reverse engineering or obvious attempts to examine the C2 by anti-malware software.
For Phase I development, a router with pfSense was installed. Two free firewall/router
platforms were considered for this project: pfSense & VyOS. pfSense was ultimately selected
since it has the following characteristics:
1. Web GUI (graphical user interface), which allows easy management and monitoring of
the firewall/router via a web browser
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2. Stable releases (alternately VyOs has free rolling releases where new code is introduced
daily, creating unpredictability in production)
3. Resistant to scripts running on the OS
4. Used in the UB competition environment
pfSense is notoriously hard to program scripts for since there is no way to execute most
programs on the OS. Typically, it is possible to transform code from a human-readable form
into machine-readable format in a process called cross-compiling. However, since pfSense
has a tough kernel to cross compile for, all attempts to cross-compile have failed up to this
point. The only exception to this rule is the GO programming language. Additionally, the
only language it supports natively is Python and PHP. This security helps test for how
compatible the agent is on even the most secure operating systems (Netgate, n.d.).
The pfSense router was configured to connect three networks: 1) the WAN (Wide Area
Network), 2) LAN (Local Area Network), and 3) Attack (network the C2 server is on). The
WAN connects all machines to the internet and the LAN is typically where local computers and
servers reside on the network. For example, in a house, the WAN is the internet while the LAN
is where the computer you are using to read this is located on. Firewall rules can be created to
govern what is allowed to enter and what is allowed to leave the network. The testing
environment created for Phase I development is shown below in Figure 7.
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Figure 7
Phase I development testing environment topology
For the Phase I development environment an Ubuntu machine (chosen due to my familiarity with
the OS and its use during UB Lockdown competitions) was set up on the LAN to act as a Linux
OS victim machine. A Kali machine was selected because it is one of the major OSs used by and
designed for penetration testing (g0tmi1k, 2021); this machine was placed on the Attack network
to serve as the “attacker” machine for creating / editing the C2 code and to act as the C2 server.
In this environment, the “JT” C2 agent was executed on Ubuntu and pfSense.
5.1 Command File Design
One of the initial steps of software development was determining how directives would
be issued from the server to the client. Typically, C2s use a database structure to store directives
for the server to issue to agents. For example, if an attacker wanted to run a “ls” (list files in a
directory/folder) command on agent 1, then the appropriate database entry for agent 1 would be
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updated. When agent 1 connects to the server, it would receive the instructions and then update
the database with the results of its actions.
For this work, however, a novel approach was used for issuing directives. Instead of a
database, the server creates “command files” every time a new agent connects. In Phase I, these
command files were stored in /opt/c2/<ip_address> where “ip_address” is the address
the agent used to connect. Additionally, an “all” file was automatically created when the server
started up that could be used to issue a command to all available agents.
In each session (connection between the C2 and an agent), the server processes and sends
instructions first from the specific IP address file followed by the “all” file. Figure 8 and Figure 9
show the directory the command files are created in and what the command files contain when
they are first created, respectively.

Figure 8
Example contents of the command directory

During the second phase, there were issues with NAT that needed to be fixed in order for
this command file system to work on a more expanded scale. The fix for this will be discussed
during the second phase.
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Figure 9
Contents of file when command file is created
In order to understand why “none” is displayed in the first line of the file, it is important
to understand how these command files work. Each command file can be split up into three
sections. An example command file containing all three sections is included in Figure 10:

Figure 10
Command file to execute commands on 192.168.5.1
The first section of the command file tells the server what “type” of directive is being issued. For
Phase I, there were seven potential types: 1) command, 2) script, 3) script-remove, 4)
exfiltration, 5) exfiltration-remove, 6) copy, and 7) none. Defined types influence the way the
server and client proceed through the rest of the interaction. If “none” was found in the first
section, the server would send that to the agent and close the file. Therefore, in order to avoid
accidently executing any commands or repeating commands multiple times, “none” is
automatically placed into the file every time the server successfully sent directives to the agent or
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when an agent checks in for the first time. In Figure 10, this file is configured for the “command”
type which would execute commands using a command prompt/terminal.
The second section of the command file directs the server how many commands will be
sent to the agent. This is used by the server to know how many times to run the code for sending
a single command and retrieving its results from the agent. It is also used by the agent to
determine how many times to run the code (for a single command’s execution) on the victim
machine. In Figure 10, this section’s value is “2” meaning 2 commands will be run on the victim
machine.
The third section of the command file contains all of the commands to run on the victim
machine. The number of lines in this file is dependent on the value of section 2 (in this case “2”).
The two separate commands in this example are: “ls” and “whoami” (displays the current user
account used).
5.2 Server Functions
All of the C2 server’s features are implemented through one or more functions for better
organization. In total, 11 functions were implemented that will be discussed in detail below in
the order of occurrence. Due to security concerns, no code will be published in this paper.
However, it should be simple enough to replicate using the information provided.
1. Initial_Setup: This function was designed to set up all of the necessary directories and
files needed to run the server. For this phase, the function asks the user for the location
where command files and output/errors from directives go. It then creates the directories
specified (if they do not already exist) and the “all” file within the command file
directory. Figure 11 shows the resulting directory structure.
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Figure 11
Resulting folder structure from the initial setup function (with defaults)
After running this function, the server starts accepting connections on a specified TCP (Transport
Control Protocol) port. In order to blend into traffic, this is set to port 80 to mimic an HTTP web
server. Please note that it is not actually using the HTTP protocol, rather it is simply designed to
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use the standard port for HTTP traffic. When the server receives a connection from the client, it
captures the current time in month/date/year minute:hour:second format.
It then creates a new thread to call the handler function (described in more detail next) to interact
with the client further. A thread can be thought of as a way to run multiple pieces of code at
once. For example, one client could be just connecting to the server while simultaneously
another client is receiving directives from the server. This is how the server can handle multiple
connections simultaneously.
2. Handler: This function is designed to handle administrative tasks for the client. If the
client indicates this is the first time it is connecting, then the function calls the
Add_Agent function to create the proper files for the client. If the client indicates this is
not the first time connecting, then it calls the Outputter function to log the connection
timestamp and uses the Get_Types_Specific, and the Get_Types_All function to see if
there are any other actions that needs to be taken. Once this is completed, it erases the
command file using the Add_Agent function and logs the time in seconds the client is
expected to reconnect in. It then closes the connection with the client.
3. Add_Agent: This function is designed to create a new agent when called by creating the
command file under <command_file_location>/<IP_Address>. It also creates
a new directory under this file path: <output_file_location>/<IP_Address>.
4. Outputter: This function is designed to be the server’s logging mechanism for directive
results and connection logs.
5. Get_Types_Specific: This function is designed to read section one of the specific agent’s
command file. For example, if the agent has an IP of 192.168.1.1 the function would read
<command_file_location>/192.168.1.1. It sends the type to the client to
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prepare it for the next stage and runs one of these functions depending on the type:
Get_Commands, Get_Num_Files_To_Copy, or Get_Files_To_Be_Exfiltrated.
6. Get_Types_All: This function is the same as the Get_Types_Specific function except it
reads this file: <command_file_location>/all instead.
7. Get_Commands: This function is designed to read sections 2 and 3 of the command file.
It sends the value of section 2 to the client to prepare it to execute the number of
commands in the file. It then sends one command from section 3 and waits for an
output/error from the client. From there, it logs the output/error into
<output_file_location>/<IP_Address>. This repeats until the end of the file
is reached, at which point the function is exited.
8. Get_Num_Files_To_Copy: This function is called to read section two and three of the
command file. The function is run if section one has either of these types: “script”,
“script-remove”, or “copy”. It sends the value of section two to the client to prepare it to
receive the number of files the server is sending. All of these types involve copying a file
from the attacker’s machine to the victim machine. This function reads the location of the
file on the attacker’s machine and links it to the destination on the victim’s machine. It
then calls the “Copy_File” function.
9. Copy_File: This function is called to act on the information gathered in the
Get_Num_Files_To_Copy function. It copies the files to the victim machine and exits
unless the “script” or “script-remove” type is called. If this is the case, it collects output
from the script and logs it to
<output_file_location>/<IP_Address>/output.
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10. Get_Files_To_Be_Exfiltrated: This function is called to read section two and three of the
command file. The function is run if section one has one of the following types: “exfil” or
“exfil-remove”. It sends the value of section two to the client to prepare it to send the
requested number of files. The point of this function is to read the file path (location) of
the file to be retrieved. It then calls the Exfiltrate_Files function.
11. Exfiltrate_Files: This function is called to act on the information gathered in the
Get_Files_To_Be_Exfiltrated function. It receives the file data from the client and
outputs it to
<output_file_location>/<IP_Address>/<name_of_received_file>.
If the client reports to the server that the requested file does not exist, this function
outputs an error message to
<output_file_location>/IP_Address/error_log.
5.3 Client Functions
Just like the C2 server, all of the C2 client’s functionality is implemented through one or
more functions for better organization. In total, there were five functions implemented, which
this section will cover in the order of occurrence.
Before calling any functions, the client sets a socket timeout of 10 seconds and attempts
to connect to the server. This timeout ensures the agent eventually moves on if there is a
breakdown in communication between the client and the server. If it receives a timeout error, it
makes a note of it and waits for a couple of seconds and tries again. If it receives more than one
timeout error, it attempts to disable the firewall rules on the client. The first time it connects to
the server it sends “Make agent” to the server in order to signal a new agent connection. After
this signal is sent, it sleeps for 60-71 seconds and sends the time to the server. The variable
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“sleeptime” was developed in an attempt to throw off detection software looking for connections
at a constant interval.
On subsequent connections, it runs a loop for two times (one time for the specified file
and one time for the “all” file) to determine which of these functions to run based on the type
sent from the server: “Execute_Command”, “Receive_Files”, or “Verify_Files”.
1. Execute_Command: This function is executed if the “command” type is received from
the server. It is designed to execute X number of commands on the system. Depending on
the number received from the server, it runs a loop X number of times to execute code to
run a command and send the output to the server. For example, if it receives a “3” from
the server, it will run through the code three times.
2. Receive_Files: This function is executed if one of these types is received from the
server: “copy”, “script”, and “script-remove”. Similar to the “Execute_Command”
function, it runs a loop X number of times to execute code to retrieve a file from the
server. If it is a “script” type, it sets up the file to be executed on the victim computer and
executes it. It then sends the resulting output/errors from the script to the server.
3. Verify_Files: This function is the first function executed if one of the types is received
from the server: “exfil” or “exfil-remove”. It simply checks to see if each file requested
by the server exists; if it does not exist, it reports that the file is not found. Afterwards, it
executes the “Send_File_Info” function.
4. Send_File_Info: This function is deprecated and not required to successfully exfiltrate the
file. All it does is retrieve the file size of the file and send it to the server. It then calls the
“Send_It” function.
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5. Send_It: This function sends the requested file to the server. If the type received from the
server is “exfil-remove”, it removes the file after it finishes sending.
5.4 Connection Between Agent and Server

Figure 12
First connection between the C2 server & agent
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Figure 12 demonstrates how an agent first checks in to the C2 server. The agent sends the
string “Make Agent” to the C2 server. From there, the C2 server creates a new thread and logs
the connection time into /opt/c2/output/connection_log (or
<output_file_location>/connection_log), Finally, the agent calculates a random
number between 61-70 seconds to sleep for and sends that to the C2 server. The server then logs
the sleep number in the “connection_log”. For the first phase, none of the communication is
encrypted.

Figure 13
Example of command directive process
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Figure 13 demonstrates what happens when an agent checks in after the first check in and
sees receives the information contained in the command file in Figure 10. The “sleeptime” is
only sent after this process is repeated for the “all” file, which is setup for the user to send a
single directive to all agents. The “all” file could either have the command type, in which case
this process occurs twice, or another type which could slightly change this process.
5.5 Management of Multiple Agents
Now that all of the functions were successfully developed, the next step was to create a
method to easily deploy directives to multiple agents. This was done by creating a management
script to take user input and modify command files according to user specifications.
5.5.1 Management Functions
Similar to the server and client, all of management server’s functionality is implemented
through one or more functions for better organization. In total, there were 13 functions which
this section will cover in the order of occurrence.
1. Get_File_Locations: Simply asks the user for the location of the command files, the
default value is /opt/c2/command.
2. Get_Agents: Opens the command file directory and assigns an ID number starting from 1
to every file found within the directory. This is so that the user can simply type in a list of
IDs instead of a list of IP Addresses.
3. Make_Script_File: Executed when the user wants to send either the “script” or “scriptremove” type. This function gathers the information needed to create the file and which
agents the user wants to target by calling “Get_Scripts” and “Which_Agents”. It also asks
the user if they want to overwrite the command file by running the “Overwrite” function.
If they say they do not want to overwrite the file and the file contains either the “script”
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or the “script-remove” type, then the “Edit_File_With_The_Correct_Type” is executed.
However, if the type on the file says something besides “script” or “script-remove”, the
command file is overwritten by the function regardless.
4. Get_Scripts: Asks the user for the location of the script on the C2 server and for the
desired destination location on the client.
5. Which_Agents: Displays a list of agent IDs and their corresponding IP Addresses. The
user is then prompted to enter in a list of agents to write the file on.
6. Overwrite: Asks the user if they want to overwrite the existing agent file with the new file
that will be created.
7. Edit_File_With_Correct_Type: Updates section two of the command file with the correct
length of section three. For example, if previously section 2 of the command file had the
value “2”, but the user added two additional commands afterwards using the management
script, then this function would update section 2’s value to “4”.
8. Make_Command_File: Executed when the user wants to send the command type to the
client. This function follows the exact same logic and executes the exact same functions
as the “Make_Script_File” function, however, instead of calling the “Get_Scripts”
function it calls the “Get_Commands” function.
9. Get_Commands: Asks the user for a list of commands to execute on the client.
10. Make_Exfil_File: Executed when the user wants to send either the “exfil” type or the
“exfil-remove” type to the client. This function follows the exact same logic and executes
the exact same functions as the “Make_Script_File” and “Make_Command_File”
functions, however, instead of calling the “Get_Scripts” or the “Get_Commands”
function it calls the “Get_Exfil_Info” function.
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11. Get_Exfil_Info: Asks the user for the location of the file to exfiltrate on the victim
computer.
12. Make_Copy_File: Executed when the user wants to send the copy type to the client. This
function follows the exact same logic and executes the exact same functions as the
“Make_Script_File”, “Make_Command_File”, and “Make_Exfil_File” functions,
however, instead of calling the “Get_Scripts”, the “Get_Commands”, or the
“Get_Exfil_Info” functions it calls the “Get_Copy_Info” function.
13. Get_Copy_Info: Asks the user for the location of the file to copy on the C2 server and for
the desired destination location on the client.
5.6 Overview of Functionality at the End of Development Phase I
Table 4
Phase I functionality goals update

Table 4 displays the progress made during Phase I’s development phase. At this point,
most of the basic features were successfully implemented on all platforms besides Windows.
Since the development environment purposely did not include a Windows machine, most of the
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rows are marked as unknown. Most likely, however, all of the functionalities would work on
Windows as well.
6. Testing – Phase I
Once the first development phase was completed, it was necessary to test the C2 in a
competition environment. The competition topology for Phase I can be found in Figure 15.

Figure 14
UB Lockdown topology (State University of New York at Buffalo, 2020)
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The environment shown in Figure 14 was deployed by UB students through VMware ESXi.
Since the C2 was never stress-tested, a limited deployment was done on only the pfSense
firewall. This ensured that a decent stress-test could be performed on the C2 infrastructure while
testing discoverability and functionality at a large scale. There were seven teams of six college
students in total with one pfSense firewall for each team. Therefore, seven agents were running
and calling back to the C2 server at the beginning of the competition. Before the competition
started, four items were loaded onto every pfSense firewall:
1. The C2 agent (manually copied to the firewall through SSH (Secure Shell) and executed)
2. A PAM backdoor in order to login without a password (deployed via Ansible playbooks)
3. A persistent user on the pfSense WebGui (deployed via Ansible playbooks)
4. Script to set securelevel to “3” at startup (deployed via Ansible playbooks)
Items two (2) and three (3) were to ensure that there was a backup method to log onto pfSense
and investigate if the C2 agent was discovered and killed. Securelevel is a security measure on
pfSense that, among other changes, blocks users from modifying the firewall rules unless they
reboot the system to lower the securelevel; the purpose of securelevel is to ensure that an attacker
cannot change the firewall rules to be more permissive once this is enabled unless the system is
rebooted. The decision was made to allow anything on all interfaces and then up securelevel to 3.
A script was installed to raise the securelevel at startup under the /usr/local/etc/rc.d/
directory. By doing this, teams would have no way to modify firewall rules unless the
startup script was removed and the pfSense router rebooted. This was done for a couple of
reasons: popular demand by the other red teamers, and to mostly eliminate any other causes of
the agent failing besides discovery.
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6.1 Testing Results – Phase I

Figure 15
Terminals displaying server output during competition
Figure 15 depicts the server in action during the competition. The left terminal shows
both the command files and the output directory at the end of the competition. There are eight
command files because one of the teams was a “test” team. The right terminal has server output
from the beginning of the competition. It was set to be extremely noisy (significant amount of
output printed) at the beginning for debugging purposes. This output was turned off one hour
into the competition.
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Table 5
Phase I functionality results

Table 5 shows the results of testing the “JT” C2 Framework’s functionality features
during the competition. The command, and all file functionality worked without any issues.
However, an unexpected situation occurred when attempting to exfiltrate a network packet
capture generated by one of the teams (that could provide useful information about the network
activity). Since the network capture was a binary file (non-human readable file), a bug occurred
in all functions that relied on copying a file from one machine to the other and the C2 server had
to be restarted.
Overall, 2 out of 7 teams detected the C2 agent and killed it. To investigate, I ran the “ps
aux | grep ‘python’” command in order to list all processes running and filtering the
results for any process running with python. A normal result would show the C2 agent running in
the background, however, in this case, the filter returned no output besides an unrelated entry.
Upon inspection of the directory the agent was placed in, it was found that, in both cases, the
agent was removed from the system. Additionally, at the end of the competition, another team
successfully managed to replace their pfSense firewall with the Palo Alto Networks alternative.
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Unfortunately, the Palo Alto Networks firewall was not within scope of red team activity so there
were no persistence mechanisms on their router.
6.2 Discussion of Testing – Phase I Results
Before the testing phase began, it was expected at least half of the teams would find the
agent running on their firewall for two reasons. The first was that it was relatively easy to detect
the agent running in the background. Secondly, no encryption was implemented. It is important
to note there was no effort to hide the agent’s process. Therefore, it was relatively easy to find
the agent running in the background using the “ps aux” command.
Encryption was not fully implemented at the end of the Phase I development and was
therefore not tested in this phase. Therefore, it was surprising that only 29% of the “JT” C2a
gents were found and killed. This percentage does not include the team that replaced the pfSense
firewall with the Palo Alto Networks one since the agent was not lost due to detection, but rather
an infrastructure choice.
Unfortunately, due to the virtual format of the competition, I was unable to talk directly
to the two teams who found and killed the C2 agent. However, a bug causing the errors was ruled
out since the agents were removed in both instances. Additionally, it is believed that the teams
reported the C2 server’s IP in submitted incident response (IR) reports (which are sent when an
incident, such as a cyber-attack, is discovered) since the necessary connection information (IP
address & the port) was placed directly into the script instead of being passed through a
configuration file.
Generally, all functionality worked as intended. Binary files were unable to be sent and
received due to a bug in the way the server and client handles determining the end of the file.
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However, this was an extremely minor setback that was fixed immediately after the competition.
The functionality used the most was the command type followed by the script-remove type. The
functionality that was used the least was the copy type which was only used in order to
thoroughly test all functionality types. Additionally, the agent’s ability to temporarily disable
pfSense’s firewall when firewall rules were blocking the agent’s connection was not tested
during the testing phase due to the implementation of secure levels.
The management script worked efficiently and was able to quickly update multiple
command files. However, if there were more agents, it would have been cumbersome to put in
each target agent ID. This was fixed during the next development phase.
7. Development – Phase II
Before continuing development of the software, additional Windows machines were
added to the network. In order to ensure that the script would work on most Windows OS, both a
Windows 10 and a Windows 7 was added to the LAN interface. This addresses the lack of
substantial testing on a Windows OS during Phase I. The new topology for this phase is shown in
Figure 16.
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Figure 16
Testing environment for phase II development
7.1 Goals for This Phase
One of the most important features missing from the C2 was support for SSL encryption.
This is a major security flaw because up to this point anyone monitoring network traffic would
be able to see communication between the C2 server and the agent. Additionally, a method to
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hide the agent’s process from commands such as ‘ps aux’ was needed in order to lower the
number of teams who found the agent. Finally, better organization and support for OS crosscompatibility is essential in order to add more agents during the testing phase. Besides the
previous two stated goals, this phase aimed to implement as many advanced functions as
possible before the second competition started. In other words, the major goals for this phase
could be boiled down to the following: encryption, stealth, OS cross-compatibility, and advanced
features.
7.2 Types Added
In order to achieve this phase’s goals, it was necessary to implement four (4) additional
types.
1. IP_change: Changes the server IP address the C2 agent reaches out to during the
competition. This is used only while the agent is running.
2. port_change: Changes the destination port the C2 agent uses to reach out to the server.
3. full_change: Changes both the server IP address and the destination port the C2 agent
uses to reach out to.
4. reverse_shell: Commands the agent to start an interactive reverse shell session with the
server on a specific port.
7.3 Updated Server Functions
•

Initial_Setup: This function was updated to add a file named, “OS_List”. The “OS_List”
file would keep track of the different operating systems the server encountered.
Additionally, this function is now capable of retrieving the client scripts from a GitHub
repo using an access token. This was implemented to support the install script that is
discussed later in the paper.
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After this function, a new thread is created to call the “Execute_Simple_HTTP” function.
Additionally, SSL encryption is setup before the server begins listening on the designated port.
Aside from those updates, the process is the same as the one listed in the Phase I Server
Functions section after the “Initial_Setup” function.
•

Handler: This function was updated to write to the “OS_List” file whenever a new OS
was discovered. For example, if an agent is running on a Windows system and it sends
the string “Windows” to the server, this function determines if it needs to add “Windows”
to the “OS_List” file. Additionally, the way it calls the Make_Agent function was
modified so that the new command file naming convention is <IP_Address>_<OS>.
For an example of this, please refer to Figure 14 below. In order to improve agent
tracking, the “Handler” function was updated to call the “Send_Update” function
whenever an agent connects to the server. This will be talked about in the next section.
One of the issues fixed inside the “Handler” function was how the server deals with

NAT. This system was implemented to address the shortage of routable IP addresses. With this
system, all that is needed is one routable IP assigned to a router used by all hosts within the
network. All internal hosts are assigned a private IP address in order to communicate within the
network.
As a result, if the C2 server needs to receive communications from a separate network, it
would only see the one routable IP address. This caused conflicts within the command file
structure since it is organized by IP address and OS. In order to fix this, the “Handler” listens for
one more communication from the client in order to determine its internal address. It then uses
that internal address to uniquely identify the agent. The issue with this fix is further discussed
under the Limitations section.
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•

Get_Types_Specific: This function was updated to call the “Basic_Info_Change”
function and reverse_shell function in order to implement the four additional types listed
above.

•

Get_Types_All: This function was updated along with the Get_Types_Specific function.

7.4 New Server Functions
Most of the major new functionality added to this server, with the exception of SSL
encryption, was implemented through new functions. After this phase was completed, there were
a total of 15 server functions.
•

Execute_Simple_HTTP: This function was created to simply call an ingrained Python
module called “SimpleHTTPServer”. The server allows the install script to retrieve the
proper agents from the server.

•

Send_Update: This function was integrated as a plugin for a publicly available board
designed for red team competition engagements called ‘pwnboard’ (micahjmartin,
hightopfade, zgtrace, f1rehaz4rd, & degenerat3, 2018). This pwnboard had a plugin
available for python that was slightly modified for use in this function. Every time an
agent is run through the Handler function, this function is executed in order to record a
successful check-in by the agent.

•

Basic_Info_Change: This function is executed if one of these types are detected:
“IP_change, “port_change” or “full_change”. It only reads and sends section three of the
command file to the client since these types do not require section two.

•

Reverse_Shell: This function is executed when the “reverse_shell” type is detected. It
only reads and sends section three of the command file that contains the port to use for
the shell. No IP is included since the client uses the C2 server’s IP address by default.
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7.5 Updated Client Functions
Since the client is not as organized into functions compared to the server, there were less
function updates. However, the process before functions is called was slightly updated. In order
to boost security, the client determines the C2 server’s IP address, port number, location of
important SSL files, and how long to sleep for by reading from a configuration file created by the
install script.
Afterwards, it attempts to establish an encrypted connection to the C2 server. If this fails,
the functionality that disabled firewall rules on pfSense was expanded in order to disable iptables
on Linux and Windows Defender on Windows. Once it successfully establishes a connection to
the C2 server, it determines the internal IP address of the machine it is running and sends it to the
server. Finally, the agent was updated to properly respond to the new types implemented in the
server. If the “full_change”, “port_change”, and “IP_change” types are received no functions are
called. The following already existing functions were updated:
•

Copy_File: Included new logic to tests whether the OS is Windows. If Windows, it skips
a step in executing a script received from the “script” or “script-remove” type. Currently,
the client only supports executing batch scripts on a Windows client.

7.6 New Client Functions
In order to implement the “reverse_shell” type, one additional function was created on
the client. After this phase was completed, there was a total of 6 client functions.
•

Reverse_It: This function is called whenever the “reverse_shell” type is received from the
server. It creates a new connection to the server using the received port. The code used
for this can be found publicly (Reverse Shell Cheat Sheet, n.d.) .
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7.7 New Install Script
An install script was created in order to deploy a client efficiently and securely on the
victim machine. After running, the install script deletes itself from the system in order to hide
evidence of the installation process. Two versions of the script were created: one for bash and
one for sh. Bash and sh are different implementations of the terminal on Linux & FreeBSD. On
most systems, bash is the default terminal shell, however, in barebones systems, sh may be the
only shell available.
7.7.1 Bash Version
The bash version of the script determines what python interpreter is installed on the
system. Even though there is no official C2 client version that supports python versions lower
than 2, it tests for older python versions just in case. Depending on the python interpreter found,
the script makes an unencrypted GET request to retrieve the appropriate client from the server.
It then creates a new file in /tmp and writes configuration information such as the C2
server’s IP address and port. This file is read by the client in order to determine where and how
to make a connection to the C2 server. From there, it edits the shebang line of the client file
(which provides a path to the interpreter that executes the script) and runs the client. This script
also automatically implements stealth features to hide processes that were inspired by Jakob Lell
(2014) & a GitHub script developed by Max Kirby (2019) named Expansive Backup. After 10
seconds, the script deletes itself and the file created in /tmp.
7.7.2 Sh Version
This script version’s behavior is almost exactly the same as the bash version except it
does not support the process to look for python versions. Therefore, it assumes the python
version is 3 and skips to the unencrypted GET request.
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7.7.3 PowerShell Version
There is no PowerShell version because of UAC (User Account Control) blocking the
script from running with the highest permissions available. Therefore, it is important that a UAC
bypass is included while running the agent automatically otherwise it will fail.
7.8 Updated Management Functions
Management was updated to add in an option for regular expressions (regex) and to
support selecting all agents running a certain OS (e.g., Windows). A regex is a string used by the
computer to search for a pattern within another string. It is useful in this case because it allows
users to mass select agents with one or two words.
1. Get_File_Locations: Updated to ask the user for the location of the “OS_List” file. It
defaults to /opt/c2.
2. Get_Agents: Updated to read the C2-generated “OS_List” file and output the contents
along with the individual agents. This allows the user to select a target OS instead of
individual agents. For example, if a user wants to attack all Linux systems they could
select “Linux” instead of all of the corresponding Linux IDs.
3. Which_Agents: Updated to provide a regex option for the user. If the user decides to not
use a regex, then this function was updated to call the “Clean_List” function.
7.9 New Management Functions
New types were added through two new functions. After this phase was completed, there
were 15 functions.
1. Make_Information_File: Executed when the user wants to send the “full_change”,
“port_change”, “IP_change”, or “reverse_shell” type. This function gathers the
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information needed to create the file and which agents the user wants to target by calling
“Get_Information” and “Which_Agents”. It automatically erases the target command file.
2. Get_Information: This function is called in order to receive the information necessary for
the “full_change”, “IP_change”, “port_change”, & “reverse_shell” types. Depending on
the type, this function would collect one or both of the following: IP of new C2 & new
port for C2.
7.10 Overview of Functionality at the End of Development Phase II

Table 6
Phase II functionality goals update

Table 6 displays the progress made during Phase II development. At this point, most of
the basic features were implemented on all OSs. The only basic feature that was not successfully
implemented on all platforms was the install script due to UAC issues on Windows.
Additionally, two out of five of the advanced functionality goals were developed successfully.
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8. Testing Phase II

Figure 17
Competition topology for phase II (State University of New York at Buffalo, 2021)

Figure 17 depicts the competition topology for Phase II testing. Deployment of the agent
to every machine shown on the topology was attempted. Unfortunately, there were issues
deploying to Windows machines due to time constraints and a lack of automation. Therefore, the
Windows version of the agent was not tested. There were seven teams of six high school students
in total with one pfSense and six Linux machines for each team. In total 42 agents were calling
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back to the C2 server during the competition. Before the competition started, four items were
loaded onto every pfSense firewall:
1. The C2 agent (Ansible deployed sh version of install.sh script which then installed the
agent)
2. A PAM backdoor in order to login without a password (deployed via Ansible playbooks)
3. A persistent user on the pfSense WebGui (deployed via Ansible playbooks)
Again, items two and three were to ensure that there was another method to log into pfSense and
investigate if the “JT” C2 agent was discovered and killed. On every Linux machine, the agent
was deployed through the bash version of the install.sh script. If the agent was killed, other red
team members would be able to assist in regaining access to the host to investigate the cause.

54

8.1 Testing Results Phase II

Table 7
Phase II functionality results

Table 7 shows the results of testing the “JT” C2 Framework’s functionality features
during the competition. There were no bugs discovered during testing, however, the reverse shell
was only effectively able to work on one agent at a time even though the server was able to field
multiple connections at once.
No agents were detected and killed during the competition by any of the seven teams.
However, two teams broke their firewalls and were forced to revert to a backup copy(which did
not contain the C2 agent”. A third team used their pfSense firewall to block connections to every
IP address besides a certain range. The C2 agent on the pfSense was still able to successfully
reach out to the C2 server by temporarily disabling pfSense’s firewall rules.
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8.2 Discussion of Testing Results – Phase II
This test demonstrated that the stealth techniques employed worked to better hide the
agents on the victim machines and avoid discovery. However, it is worth noting that this
competition was against high school students and not against college students as in the previous
test. Even though some extremely knowledgeable high school students participated, this test is
not directly comparable with Phase I’s results since it was against potentially less experienced
participants.

Figure 18
Engine alias created by one of the teams
As stated in the results, one of the teams was able to implement strict enough rules in
their firewall that prevented red team activity. Figure 18 depicts the alias “engine” that
contained a list of IP addresses to allow through the firewall. No picture of the firewall rules
itself was taken, however, the rules created allowed anything from the above IP addresses and
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denied everything else. The C2’s capability of disabling firewall rules allowed exfiltration of the
necessary file necessary to gain an understanding of their rules and circumvent it.
At first, the reverse shell was utilized in order to run commands. While using the
functionality, every time pfSense’s firewall capability came back online, it quickly disconnected.
In order to permanently circumvent the rules, an IP address included in the allow list was used
instead and the problematic firewall rules were disabled. In order to maintain access to the rest of
the agents, the “IP_change” type was used to communicate my new IP address to them before
switching.
9. Discussion of Functionality Not Implemented
According to Table 6, only four functionality goals were not implemented. This was
mainly due to the short time frame between competitions and a focus on other, more essential,
parts of the code. Based on previously developed C2s, it appears possible to implement these
features using existing code. For example, Pupy successfully uses Python to implement module
extensibility, fileless execution, and process injection (alxchk et al., 2015). It is possible to adopt
that code into a method that would work for raw socket based C2s. Additionally, a simple for
loop could be used to interpret multiple C2s.
10. Limitations
Most of this work’s limitations stem from the conditions created by the COVID-19
pandemic. For example, the testing environment (cyber defense competitions) were virtual
instead of in-person which made it difficult to interact with teams who discovered the C2 agent
in the first phase and prevented collection of data related to how it was identified. To account for
this, each time an agent’s connection was terminated, an investigation was launched into the
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cause. As such, only circumstantial evidence was acquired and the actual method for detection
was uncertain and could only be deduced. Additionally, time was a large factor in determining
how many competitions the C2 could be tested in. This forced an uneven comparison between a
collegiate cyber competition and a high school cyber competition.
Other limitations stemmed from a lack of financial resources to complete this study. This
prevented access to commercial C2s (e.g., Cobalt Strike); and limited testing the C2 on a
virtualized network. As a result, it is inconclusive if the “JT” C2 will run on physical computers
such as workstations.
A fix for NAT was implemented during Phase II’s development. This fix will run into
issues if the C2 is deployed to multiple company’s networks. This is because multiple companies
may use the same private IP address within their networks. As a result, the C2 server will be
confused and retrieve commands from the wrong command file. Therefore, the current state this
C2 server is in is not suitable for mass real world deployment.
11. Conclusion & Future Research
Evaluating and considering new C2s is increasingly important in order to proactively
defend against attackers. Overall, this study built a functional cross-platform socket-based C2
that is capable of managing at least 42 unique connections at once while staying largely
undetected on a target host. However, there are still many areas for further investigation and
development.
Future iterations of this C2 could use a database format instead of file format for storing
data since it was difficult to view output from all of the different agents. Additionally, research
should consider the latest detection technology available as this is constantly being improved.
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One aspect to be further investigated is network-based detection avoidance of socket-based C2
using inconsistent connection times and variable traffic length; this study mainly looks at hostbased detection mechanisms. Another area of future study is testing both encrypted and
unencrypted version of the C2 to clearly determine if one is better at avoiding detection.
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